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Geography 490

Land Use Practices in Clayoquot Sound: An Assessment of Success of the 1993 Protest

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Abstract

The summer of 1993 saw a protest in Clayoquot Sound, on the west coast of Vancouver Island, British Columbia of unprecedented size and scope. The protests arose from industrial logging activities of the Sound's old-growth forests. The conflict in Clayoquot Sound represents the extent of the contention of land use planning and the modern possibilities of the use of civil disobedience. Reviewing land use practices within Clayoquot Sound, the paper explores the factors leading to the protests of 1993 as well as the impacts on land use stemming from it. Using a model for assessing success on the grounds of its capabilities to garner policy change, change in policy process, and changing social values, this paper concludes that protest can be an effective stimulus for change but the changes achieved are not necessarily long withstanding nor a comprehensive solution to the original grievances.

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Clayoquot Sound, an area of seemingly endless beaches and lush rainforests set against a backdrop of jagged mountains and crashing surf, has had a more tumultuous past than the pristine scenery would have one believe. Beneath the beauty lies a past fraught with conflict. This conflict culminated in the summer of 1993 when the Sound was the site of the largest act of civil disobedience in Canadian history where over 800 protesters were arrested for blockading a logging road used by MacMillan Bloedel (MB) in its operations in the forests of Clayoquot Sound.

The Sound is a biologically rich, predominantly wilderness area found on the west coast of Vancouver Island, British Columbia (B. C.), Canada. It encompasses approximately 350,000 hectares of both marine and terrestrial ecosystems, comprising about eight percent of Vancouver Island (Clayoquot Sound Sustainable Development Strategy Steering Committee, 1992). The area includes Hesquiat and Esowista Peninsulas, the islands, seas, lands, and waters draining into the Pacific Ocean from Escalante Point in the north and Quisitis Point in the South (Province of British Columbia, 1993).

The purely terrestrial portion of Clayoquot Sound comprises 262, 592 hectares and of that, nearly ninety-three percent (244,150 hectares) is forested land (Clayoquot Sound Central Region Board, 2006). This land is primarily forests of the wet Coastal Western Hemlock biogeoclimatic zone, the most productive forest region in Canada (Pojar, Klinka and Demarchi, 1991). Along with the dominant species for which the zone is named, Sitka spruce (*Picea sitchensis*), western red cedar (*Thuja plicata*), and yellow cedar (*Chamaecyparis nootkatensis*) thrive as a result of the generous precipitation and their tolerance to shady canopies. These forests make up a portion of

the North American temperate rain forest found in the Pacific Northwest along the coast from Alaska through B. C. and the states of Washington and Oregon to California. Due to the age and complexity of the majority of these forests, they are classified as old-growth or late successional forests. Resource extraction activities have modified most of the temperate rain forest outside of parks in the American Pacific Northwest (Clayoquot Sound Sustainable Development Strategy Steering Committee, 1992). Alaska and B. C., however, still have tracts of forests in their natural state of late succession and Clayoquot Sound is one such tract. Forty-two percent of B. C.'s forests or 25 million hectares are old-growth, defined in the province as forests on the coast older than 250 years, and forests in the interior older than 140 years for most tree species (older than 120 years for lodgepole pine and deciduous species) (BC Market Outreach Network, 2005; MacKinnon and Vold, 1998; Ecotrust Canada, 2005).

Clayoquot Sound is the traditional territory of the Nuu-chah-nulth First Nations and today four communities reside within the Sound: the Nuu-chah-nulth communities of Ahousaht, Tla-o-qui-aht, and Hesquiaht, and Tofino. South of the Sound reside the Ucluelet and Toquaht bands and the community of Ucluelet. Traditionally, fishing (particularly whaling and the salmon fishery) and gathering activities have formed the subsistence for the Nuu-chah-nulth people. Today, the local economy of the Regional District is driven by tourism, aquaculture, fisheries, and to a lesser degree, forestry (Province of British Columbia, 1993).

The area supports many resources and other values: old-growth timber, fisheries and aquaculture, scenic landscapes for tourism, cultures and local economies, and a combination of freshwater, marine, and land ecosystems. Conflicting and increasing

demands on the Sound's resources make ensuring their sustainability a somewhat difficult task. As a result of the area's beauty and high "resource value" as well as the incompatible demands on the use of its resources, this area has had a history of conflict related to land use planning. The protest in 1993, arising from the objection to the liquidation and conversion of old-growth to plantation crop forests in Clayoquot Sound, can be seen in light of its influence on land use practices. Encasing the event within the broader literature on land use practices and civil disobedience, this paper will concentrate on conflict and its role in altering land use practices and bringing about land use change by using Clayoquot Sound as a case study. Through a review and analysis of land use practices both prior to and following the 1993 mass protests, it is evident that conflict can be an effective stimulus for change; however, the changes that are exhibited may not necessarily be permanent nor an all-encompassing solution to the original grievances.

Land Use Planning

Land use, or how a certain area of land is developed and utilized, is decided and derived from governmental bodies' zoning and designating lands for certain uses and can include forestry, agriculture, range, urban, rural, and industrial uses (Medler and Mushkatel, 1979). Land use allocation can be highly contentious due to the conflicting values and goals of each sector; stakeholders see land's potential through their own biased lenses and often the only way one type of land use can expand is by displacing another (Kelso, 1962). Conflict over the best use for an area involves public values versus market values and can involve the ethical debate over whether land should be used by the present generation or whether it should be conserved for future generations (Kelso, 1962). In addition to the various human use demands, land use planning must try to

balance human demands for a high quality of life and the maintenance of ecological processes and biodiversity (Johnson and Campbell, 1999). It is closely linked to food supply, energy resources, environmental quality, and urban and rural development (Gibson and Timmons, 1976).

To sustain healthy ecosystems and healthy communities, the needs of wide number of stakeholders must be considered, including local landowners and citizen groups, municipal, provincial and federal government agencies, corporations and national environmental organizations, and the broader public, locally and nationally (Johnson and Campbell, 1999). Land use planning must incorporate social and economic, as well as ecological values. Public concern about the use of land resources increased in the 1970s in North America as a result of accelerating changes in population dynamics and life styles, stretched world food supplies and environmental pressures (Gibson and Timmons, 1976). This led to the public realization that land resources were not without limits and required management in order to be sustained over long periods of time and gave rise to the concept of integrated land use planning (Soule, 1991). Debate over land use is centered on the land and its resources but to Libby (1974) it also reflects “more basic human motivations and values – stability, privacy, freedom, and income” (p. 1143). The controversy surrounding land use planning can and does lead to conflicts. They arise because land is in limited and fairly predetermined supply and demands on that land are “unlimited and diverse” (Kelso, 1962, p. 228).

In Clayoquot Sound, land use designation has been derived from (in a non-exhaustive list) the federal Departments of Indian and Northern Affairs, Environment Canada, Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Natural Resources Canada, and Parks Canada, and

the provincial ministries of Energy, Mines and Petroleum Resources, Aquaculture and Fisheries, Tourism, Environment, and Forests and Range (Government of Canada, 2007; B. C. Government, 2007). In the case of Clayoquot Sound, the temperate rainforest makes the land attractive to development for forestry uses but also for tourism ventures and recreation. One jurisdiction's designation may affect (positively or negatively) the goals of another jurisdiction (for example the Ministry of Forest and Range designating an area for harvesting which negatively impacts a park designated by the either B. C. Parks or Parks Canada).

Deforestation (and as a result water supply degradation, depletion of fish stocks, loss of biodiversity and habitat, and loss of carbon sequestration) is the predominant environmental concern associated with the logging of old-growth in Clayoquot Sound and is the main source of conflict (Carruthers, Backus, Mertens and Lackey, 1997). Deforestation is seen by Homer-Dixon (1991) to be one of seven major environmental problems which can lead to conflict within a country. Pollution of water supplies and depletion of fish stocks are two additional issues that can lead to conflict and both can be derived from deforestation that occurs within watersheds (Homer-Dixon, 1991).

“Resource frontiers” no longer exist. Nearly all changes of land use, new development, or expansion of any resource use now involve conflict (Ayling and Kelly, 1997). Natural resources continue to be a root cause in armed conflicts as well as unarmed conflicts around the world (Suliman, 1999), and although often the deep sources of conflict may extend beyond disputed resources, more often than not resource conflicts are the most visible and symbolic causes of the dispute (Tungittiaplakorn, 1995).

Protest and Civil Disobedience

Public protest has increasingly become a widespread mode of political expression and, since the late 1950s, it has become the “fashionable effective tool” by which the public responds (LeGrande, 1967, p. 394). Civil disobedience, one form of protest, is a religious, political, philosophical doctrine that is virtually ageless and has been traced back as far as the sixth century B. C. A. (LeGrande, 1967; Johnson, 1967). Although elements of civil disobedience are entrenched in the Christian teachings of the modern churches and are arguably at the foundation of the establishment of the United States (U. S.) as an independent nation, the modern theory behind this practice is derived from American author, Henry David Thoreau’s 1849 essay, *Civil Disobedience* (LeGrande, 1967). His work had influence on many later instigators of acts of civil disobedience including Mahatma Gandhi, who extensively employed civil disobedience tactics in India in the first half of the 1900s, and Martin Luther King Jr., who employed them during the United States Civil Rights movement of the 1960s. By the 1970s and 1980s, protestors used civil disobedience extensively as a “highly effective means of coercive pressure for social change (LeGrande, 1967, p. 393). Civil disobedience is essentially, the conscientious disobedience of the law undertaken by a comparatively homogeneous or like-minded group aimed principally at producing a change in law, policy, or institution that is morally unjust or unacceptable (LeGrande, 1967; McCloskey, 1980). The activity is conducted as an explicit and knowing violation of the law with the intention to garner sympathetic public support and dramatize the injustice. Non-violent civil disobedience occurs when participants refuse to comply with laws they think are unjust but do not use any form of physical violence in their demonstrations (Johnson, 1967).

Assessing the effectiveness of civil disobedience events can be a difficult task and research has largely been focused on the intended effects of social movements. Success can be a subjective measure; Terchek (1974) sees change as an easier measure to examine. Effectiveness can depend on whose perspective from which the assessment is derived. Much of the research on protest has followed the inquiry of which tactical approach is the most successful to generate change (Colby, 1982; Kitschelt, 1986). Scholarship on movement success has also tended to focus on success or failure in changing particular policies (Rochon and Mazmanian, 1993). Rochon and Mazmanian (1993) argue that the success of a social movement can stem from whether the movement changed particular policies but also whether the movement instigators gained access to the policy process.

William Gamson (1990) provided the initial groundwork for the study of the determinants of success in protest movements and distinguished between two dimensions of success. He cited one form of success as the gaining of new advantages for the protesting group, labeled by Rochon and Mazmanian (1993) as policy change. Gamson's (1990) second dimension of success is the acceptance of the dissenting group itself as a legitimate organization with valid social interests. This is seen by Rochon and Mazmanian (1993) as a change in policy process because the acceptance of new groups as having legitimate interests usually leads to their inclusion in discussions informing policy. Rochon and Mazmanian (1993) expanded Gamson's (1990) dual framework of success to include a third dimension: the changing of social values. By changing social values, the authors seek to explain how when social values are changed, the perception of the most important political problems are changed, whereby redefining political agendas.

To have success in gaining the legal and behavioural changes sought by movements, there must be change present in three areas: public policy, the policy process, and social values (Rochon and Mazmanian, 1993; Vayrynen, 1991). Wilson (1961) sees protest as a bargaining resource that enables the politically powerless to organize resources and apply negative pressure on decision-makers. Effectiveness stems from the ability of the politically powerless to create disorder and apply pressure on opponents (Wilson, 1961). The value of civil disobedience rests in it being able to act as a catalyst for publicizing an unjust law, policy, or institution and success can be measured if the injustice is exposed and publicized and steps are made towards its correction (McCloskey, 1980).

One common criticism of Gamson's (1990) pioneering study is the lack of scope in time frame on which he bases his determinants of success of protest movements (Rochon and Mazmanian, 1993; Goldstone, 1980). With a longer time frame, the dissenting group may be accepted as a legitimate voice in the policy process. To take into account the framework from Gamson (1990) and the expansion by Rochon and Mazmanian (1993) both initial and later impacts will be examined in the exploration of Clayoquot Sound.

Context for Protests

Although the statistics of the total area of old-growth forests left standing on the earth are subjective, the fact remains that the area remaining is significantly lower than what existed one hundred years ago (B. C. Market Outreach Network, 2005). This has understandably led to bitter confrontation as deforestation continues. The contention in B. C., and specifically on Vancouver Island, over the harvesting of old-growth for timber production, arises out of a global context. Tasmania and the Amazon are two well-

known examples, but closer to home, so are the temperate rain forests of the American Pacific Northwest. It was here that the debate reached prominence in the late 1980s and early 1990s as a result of the fear of extinction of the northern spotted owl (*Strix occidentalis caurina*) from national forest lands of Oregon and Washington. The owl is seen as an indicator species, the canary in the coal mine of sorts: the demise of the canary in the mine indicated toxicity within the mine, just as the demise of the northern spotted owl indicates ill-health within the forest's ecosystems (Satterfield, 2002). The two polarized opinions about old-growth forests that arose in the U.S. also arose in Clayoquot Sound: some love the forests for their ability to produce high quality, finely-grained timber, while others are captivated by their genetic and ecosystem complexity, breathtaking beauty, and aesthetic, spiritual, or recreational benefits they provide.

Broad B. C. Forest Policy

To understand the root of the conflict within Clayoquot Sound a step back to explore the broad parameters around forest use in B. C. and the historical use patterns are in order. Aboriginal peoples have drawn on the cedar, fir, and hemlock resources in the forests of Coastal British Columbia since first settlement, roughly 10,000 years ago. Industrial forest exploitation did not begin until the 1850s and represented the westernmost expansion of European forest exploitation in North America. Thoughts of conservation were nonexistent: historical forest management views held that the timber resources in the province were limitless (Marchak, 1983). This early period of B. C. forest policy was typified by the government's commitment to liquidation. Forests were viewed as stockpiles of timber and the government's role was to administer access to investors for the exploitation to this seemingly endless supply of natural resources (Beebe

and Gill, 1997). The speed and extent of cutting by industrial capitalists led to the government's adoption of timber leases by the late 1880s; however, the goal was less to do with conservation and more to do with ensuring foreign investor allowed continued access to resource to facilitate domestic employment and capital generation (Hayter and Barnes, 1997).

Sustained yield or liquidation conversion policies began to take precedence in the late 1930s amongst forest policy determiners. The Sloan Royal Commissions of 1947 and 1956 set the model for the implementation of these policies within B. C. forest practices. The policies sought to liquidate primary forestland and convert it to new, second growth forests, which would provide a constant sustainable yield of fibre per year, thus promising perpetual economic benefits. Management obligations that required potential leasees to submit plans for forest use were exchanged for secure rights to large tracts of Crown timber and low stumpage rates. As a result of the stability, the resources available, and the long-term horizons, the Ministry of Forests tended to encourage big business by favouring applications for tree farm licenses (TFL) or public sustained yield units (PSYU) from large, more established forest companies (Hayter and Barnes, 1997; Marchak, 1983). That said, the concept of sustained yield was introduced without proof of its effectiveness; it was based merely on the belief that natural regeneration would restock the cutover area sufficiently prior to the next cycle of harvesting (Hayter and Barnes, 1997). Beginning in the mid 1960s, the sustained yield discourse gripping B. C. forest policy began to be influenced from proponents of multiple use or integrated resource management of forest land. It marked the recognition that forests were sources of recreational, aesthetic, and environmental values (Wilson, 1998). Influencing this shift

during the early 1970s was the realization, from government calculations, that there was increasingly little difference between the actual and the allowable cut levels on the coast of the province. This revelation was interpreted as a consequence of the “fall-down effect,” or the natural decline in timber production as the old-growth is depleted and industry moves to the cutting of second-growth. It was viewed by environmental groups as proof of the government’s historical mismanagement of the province’s forest resources and more seriously, that the amount of old-growth forest remaining on the coast was minimal (Marchak, Aycock and Herbert, 1999). Armed with this information, the environmental coalition effectively discredited the “sustained yield-integrated resource management arguments that had legitimated the liquidation-conversion project and Ministry of Forests-industry control” (Wilson, 1998, p.14). By the late 1980s, forest land use debates were increasingly influenced by the relatively-upstart field of conservation biology, an applied-oriented branch of biology dedicated to the “study of the potential loss of diversity (species, genes, habitats) encountered in a world where all units of study (species, communities) are broken into even smaller and more fragmented pieces” with an applied objective to “try to stem the loss of diversity and to help mitigate the effects of declining diversity” (Ginsberg, 1987, p. 262).

Research developed by conservation biologists supported the concept of biodiversity and the notion that old-growth forests are complex ecosystems containing a wealth of ecological diversity (Wilson, 1998). The environmental coalition readily adapted the scientific endorsement stemming from conservation biologists’ work. With a scientific basis supporting preservation, to borrow from the example so often cited in

context of the U. S., Pinchotian ideas¹, that had reigned supreme within society, were increasingly being challenged by the ideas associated with John Muir, Aldo Leopold, and their descendents.

In conjunction with the changing discourses of forest policy, broad social changes were also occurring, and influencing the events in Clayoquot Sound. The environmental movement existed for much of the twentieth century as a small niche within the larger North American context. Begun by individuals seeking to promote the conservation and preservation of the country's natural resources, the early environmental movement was highly influenced by the philosophies of Gifford Pinchot and John Muir (Turner, 2000). Beginning in the early 1970s, the environmental movement profoundly began to transform law and society. Various ecological disasters of the 1960s and 1970s along with an anti-establishment mood fostered a grassroots response within the movement. This era also saw the rise in numbers of environmental groups across North America, and particularly in the U. S. these groups were focused on litigation (Mitchell, 1992). In the U. S., the number of organizations demanding change towards the environment increased from several hundred to more than three thousand by the end of the 1970s and the number of citizens joining these organizations also grew dramatically (Sale, 1993). Membership in the twelve largest environmental organizations increased from roughly one hundred thousand in 1960 to more than one million in 1972 (Graham, 1999). Environmentalism as a movement began to awaken society and the environment became more important to the North American public. Coglianese (2001) asserts that by the

¹ Pinchotian ideas refer to the beliefs and policies stressing conservation advocated by Gifford Pinchot, the first director of the United States Forest Service. Pinchot expressed the importance of efficient management of natural resources for the continued use by humans. On the other hand, his contemporary, John Muir, advocated for preservation of wilderness and its resources on the grounds of their spiritual and uplifting values.

1980s in the U. S., the environmental movement was fully institutionalized; the use of litigation to achieve their ends became routine and incremental, environmental groups grew more professional with specialization of staff, and many groups developed extensive publishing operations to promote environmental awareness as well as to help raise necessary funds. For example, in 1981 the U. S. National Wildlife Federation operated with an annual budget of \$32 million and the Sierra Club operated with \$12 million (Shaiko, 1999). On average the full time employment rates of American environmental groups was nine times higher in 1990 than those of the early 1960s (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993). Environmentalism as a movement is seen by Brulle (2000) to have become one of the largest social movements in American history. The environmental movement in Canada followed the movement in the U. S. but it lagged behind. According to Coglianesse (2001) the environmental movement in Canada did not become fully institutionalized until the early 1990s, at least ten years after the movement in the U. S. By the 1990s, the movement had grown from a scattering of grassroots associations to be an extensive network of interest groups with a presence in all the major political centres in North America.

Prior to the Protest: 1979-1992

To understand how these broader developments came to influence land use practices in Clayoquot Sound, a narrowing of focus must be taken. The primary period to be examined is the era between 1979 with the forming of the Friends of Clayoquot Sound and 1992, one year prior to the mass arrests in Clayoquot. However, it is worth mentioning that the origins of the conflict within the Sound stem from the 1950s when MacMillan Bloedel was granted Tofino Tree Farm Licence 20 and Alberni Tree Farm

License 21 in 1955 (British Columbia Commission on Resources and Environment, 1995). By 1956, a large portion of the remainder of Clayoquot Sound was divided into Maquinna Tree Farm Licence 22 and Nitinat Tree Farm Licence 27 and granted to British Columbia Forest Products (BCFP) (British Columbia Commission on Resources and Environment, 1995). BCFP's logging rights were transferred first to Fletcher Challenge during the 1980s and then transferred to International Forest Products (Interfor) in 1992. Cutting rates within these tenures in the 1970s were estimated at three times higher than those when the tenure was first granted (Bose, 2000). As a result, in 1979 when Meares Island, the island forming the scenic background of Tofino's harbour and a source of the town's water supply, was set to be logged, a group of local citizens concerned about the proposed logging formed the Friends of Clayoquot Sound (FOCS). The growing concern prompted the establishment of the Meares Island Negotiating Committee, a two and one half year process involving input from concerned citizens, local environmentalists, members of the Nuu-Chah-Nulth First Nations, forestry union representatives, the provincial government, and MB (Ingram, 1994). MB left the negotiations in frustration, angered by the anti-logging slant of the committee's recommendations. In November 1983, the provincial Cabinet Environmental Land Use Committee (ELUC), ignoring the negotiating committee's recommendations, decided to allow MB to log ninety percent of Meares Island, with the remaining ten percent to be safe for only twenty years. In response, Clayoquot Sound residents and the Nuu-Chah-Nulth launched a blockade in 1984, from which loggers retreated, and the Clayoquot Band declared Meares Island a tribal park. The Tla-o-qui-aht and the Ahousaht obtained an injunction the following year which prohibited logging on the island until a land claim settlement could be

negotiated; however, clearcutting was continuing in the rest of Clayoquot Sound (Bose, 2000). The conflict on Meares was quelled, but was a mild foretelling of the confrontation that would ensue in Clayoquot in the next decade between the forest companies and the Native-environmentalist alliance.

The escalating conflict in Clayoquot Sound was one of the fronts on which B. C.'s so-called "War in the Woods" was being fought. This war, seen by Hayter (2003) to be three distinct disputes between trade, environment, and First Nations during the 1980s and 1990s, included conflict over other areas in B. C. including Gwaii Haanas (South Moresby), the Stein Valley, the Carmanah Valley (1988), the Tatshenshini Valley, and the Lower Walbran Valley (1991). However, it was Clayoquot Sound that marked the most monumental showdown within this war in B. C.'s wilderness (Hayter, 2003).

While these struggles over land use were occurring in Clayoquot Sound, other exterior forces were coming into play. New initiatives, including eco-tourism, were beginning to incur success in and around Clayoquot Sound and offered a viable solution to enhance and secure long-term economic and ecological stability (Bose, 2000). Many local citizens, particularly in Tofino, were engaging in the tourist economy, which was expanding as tourists flocked to the Long Beach section of Pacific Rim National Park after its creation in 1971. Hired by the Tofino-Long Beach Chamber of Commerce to carry out a regional tourism study, Ric Careless (1988) noted that tourism accounted for more than fifty percent of the employment in the Tofino area and tourist visits were increasing by three percent per year in Tofino, a faster rate than in nearby Ucluelet. He equated the difference in tourism to be a result of the large number of clearcuts surrounding Ucluelet. This increase in tourism coupled with the release of the World

Commission on Environment and Development Report (Brundtland) in 1987 fostered support for regional sustainable development with a decreased emphasis on resource extraction.

These developments were occurring concurrently as social values were changing and both contributed to the increased awareness of the multiple values of the region's forests. It came as no surprise then, that as logging trucks moved from the Sound's forests as quickly and regularly as usual, conflict became imminent. The discovery of landslides caused by road-building activity for logging purposes near Sulphur Passage, the entrance to the Megin Valley, the only remaining intact watershed larger than 20,000 hectares on Vancouver Island, prompted blockades to be set up in Sulphur Pass of Clayoquot Sound in 1988 (Wilson, 1998). The provincial government set up the Clayoquot Sound Sustainable Development Task Force and its subcommittee, the Clayoquot Sound Sustainable Development Strategy Steering Committee (CSSDSSC) in 1989 to help decide which areas should be logged and which should be protected but continued logging in areas considered prime candidates for protection threatened the work of the committee. In April 1991, the continued logging led to the burning of the Kennedy River Bridge (which provided the link to the cutblock) and MB's attempts to deviate from the obstacle failed (Ingram, 1994). The continued extraction resulted in the first serious mention by Greenpeace and the Sierra Club of a boycott of B. C. forest products in Europe. The CSSDSSC had abandoned its nearly two year search for consensus when agreement over the fate of several watersheds was unable to be reached because as negotiations occurred, logging continued. By the close of 1991, the New Democrat Party formed the new provincial government with Premier Michael Harcourt,

elected under the promise to protect Clayoquot Sound and end B. C.'s "War in the Woods." The following year another process for adjudicating resource-use conflicts, the Commission on Resources and Environment (CORE) was established, even though conflict continued with a five month long blockade at Clayoquot Arm Bridge in the summer (Langer, 1993).

1993: Clayoquot Sound in the Limelight

The year began with strong international pressure on B. C.'s government as a coalition of environmental organizations conducted a series of highly successful advertising campaigns aimed at creating boycotts of B. C. wood products. Although the government responded with damage-control trips to Europe to reassure customers, B. C.'s forest practices had been put in the international spotlight. Early in the year the provincial government purchased shares in MB and for a time, held the largest number (Shaw, 2003). An inquiry conducted indicated no conflict of interest; however, it showed the explicit link between corporate and state interests (Bose, 2000). By spring, a globally-oriented campaign against the extraction occurring within the Sound had been firmly established and international support was gathered for the local and national groups (including FOCS, Western Canada Wilderness Committee (now simply the Wilderness Committee), Sierra Club, Temperate Rainforest Alliance, and Greenpeace).

On April 13, 1993 the Government of B. C. announced "The Clayoquot Sound Land Use Decision"- a solution to balance the environmental, economic, and social needs of the area. As the largest block of old-growth on Vancouver Island, Clayoquot Sound is a key resource for the timber industry and of value to environmental groups and recreationists alike, so understandably opinions were sharply polarized at the

announcement of the decision. It added 48,500 hectares to the 39,100 hectares already protected within Clayoquot Sound, bringing the proportion of land base protected from fifteen to thirty-three percent. The newly established protected areas included the highly valued Megin watershed, parts of Vargas and Flores Islands and Hesquiat Peninsula, as well as several smaller sensitive zones (Province of British Columbia, 1993). Another 17.6 percent of the Sound was put in a new “Special Management” category, which held recreation and wildlife management zones open to selective logging and scenic corridor land to preserve visual values. Some areas in the Sound, including Meares Island, were left out of the decision due to land claim issues and the remaining lands were designated as “General Integrated Management Areas” which were open to intensive commercial logging (Province of British Columbia, 1993). According to the government’s initial estimates these changes would reduce the annual allowable cut by approximately one-third (from 900,000 cubic metres per year to 600,000 cubic metres), thus bringing about a possible loss of 400 direct forest jobs (Office of the Premier, 1993). The harvesting level, although reduced, was still a high level of clear cutting and it still occurred on old-growth trees, as the area’s second-growth timber, from logging in earlier decades, was not yet mature enough to harvest (Ingram, 1994).

Critics felt that the land use plan did little to halt ecosystem destruction within Clayoquot Sound due to the fragmented nature of the newly protected areas (the wilderness offered in the Decision was analogously compared to be reminiscent of a government office: cramped little cubby-holes of old-growth connected by narrow corridors of trees) (Struthers, 1995). Critics were also quick to point out that much of the newly protected areas contained commercially unattractive biomass (lacking old-growth

forest with large trees and consisting mainly of shrubbery and underbrush) (Shaw, 2003). The decision was also negotiated without adequate information on biological diversity and landscape processes within the Sound (Ingram, 1994). In both the “Integrated Management Areas” and the “Special Management Areas” logging could and would continue to occur. Preservation of any of the forests in these areas would only be possible after four requirements had been met. Firstly the Clayoquot Sound Scientific Panel (established in October 1993 after the summer conflict) would have to make its final recommendations and they would have to be fully implemented. Secondly, the new Forest Practices Code would have to be brought into law and fully enforced. Thirdly, formal mechanisms would have to be made to integrate requirements for protection of biological diversity to be maintained within the Scenic Corridors. Lastly, the protected area system would have to be redesigned to include a comprehensive range of the area’s different ecosystems (Ingram, 1994). Effectively, the decision, dubbed as the “Clayoquot Compromise” would allow seventy-four percent of the remaining old-growth in Clayoquot Sound to be logged (MacIssac and Champagne, 1994, p. xi).

Environmentalists reacted with anger to the decision; they saw it as a betrayal by the provincial government. Valerie Langer of the Friends of Clayoquot Sound vowed that her organisation was ready to see over 1,000 blockaders arrested in protest of the decision over the summer (Lee, 1993).

Her prediction would be not too far off the mark. As the shortcomings of the decision became apparent, protestors gained momentum. Lobbying at the provincial legislature in Victoria occurred as members of FOCS and other environmental organisations took their case to Europe. By the end of June, a protestors’ peace camp,

known of the “Black Hole,” was set up in a clearcut near the Clayoquot Arm Bridge. The scale of the protest was enormous; it was the largest environmental protest B. C. and Canada had ever seen. Tyler (1999) emphasized that worldwide information flows can quickly and easily bring local conflicts to regional or global stages, with access to telephones, the Internet, and additional communication tools making it difficult to prevent public scrutiny of conflict and conflict intervention. This was the case in Clayoquot Sound as the local FOCS garnered support from Sierra Club, Western Canada Wilderness Committee (WCWC), and Greenpeace, in order to bring the events in the Sound to the attention of the world. Throughout July, August, and September of 1993 over 10,000 people came from across the province, the country, and the world to protest the decision and blockade MacMillan Bloedel’s logging operations (MacIsaac and Champagne, 1994). Waves of support were felt throughout the world, including large demonstrations of support in Germany, Austria, United Kingdom, and U.S.

Using civil disobedience principles stemming from Thoreau, Gandhi, and Luther King Jr., the protesters would stand, sit, or lie down in the middle of the road and react without violence while police read them the injunction, arrested and walked or carried them to buses, which took them to the recreation hall in Ucluelet that served as a jail. They were then charged, photographed, assigned court dates, and released (Gibsons, 1994). Over the course of the four months of operations at the peace camp, 932 people were arrested and most were charged with criminal (rather than civil)² contempt of court for not recognizing MB’s court-obtained injunctions against interference with logging

² This was significant because throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, the Attorney General of British Columbia had followed a policy of not laying criminal charges against environmental groups or individuals engaging in civil disobedience, leaving the affected parties instead to seek civil relief through courts. Of those arrested, six hundred and twenty-six people were convicted of criminal contempt of court and sanctioned by fines of up to \$3,000 and jail terms of up to 60 days (Supreme Court of Canada, 1996).

operations (MacIssac and Champagne, 1994). The event itself was monumental; it continues to hold the title of the largest protest in Canadian history and the largest mass trial in the western world (Wilson, 1998).

Although environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGOS) had begun national and international campaigns to protect old-growth in the early 1990s, they intensified with the closing of the Peace Camp in early October 1993.³ The so-called “corporate fall” began when these organisations brought photographs, videos, and descriptions of forestry practices within Clayoquot Sound to consumers, retailers, and governments in Europe and the U. S. (Maryjka Mychajlowycz, personal communication, August 23, 2007). This, coupled with the media attention of the protests caused significant pressure on both the provincial government and the province’s forest corporations. In September, the WCWC extracted “Stumpy” a large red cedar stump from a clearcut in the Sound, sent it on a public awareness tour across North America, and then lent it to Greenpeace to take it to Europe on a similar tour (Stefanick, 2001). Demonstrations like these enabled environmental groups to gain support for a boycott campaign directed towards British Columbia’s forest industry as a whole. Clayoquot Sound was used as the poster board and stage to demonstrate all that was wrong with B. C. forest practices (Bose, 2000).

The Impacts

To assess whether conflict can be an effective stimulus for change, the determiners of success must be examined in the context of Clayoquot Sound. Success is recognized to be a difficult measure to examine: it can depend on whose perspective the

³ The Peace Camp was closed at this time because it was a natural time to end it. The rainy storm season begins in October on the west coast, students were returning to school, and the campaign needed to move to the next step (Maryjka Mychajlowycz, personal communication, August 23, 2007).

assessment is derived (Terchek, 1974). To Gamson (1990), success of a movement is derived from whether the protesting group gained new advantages, labeled by Rochon and Mazmanian (1993) as policy change. The mass protests in the summer of 1993 did bring about policy change initially. The unprecedented level of controversy and protest did reinforce the necessity of the government re-examining land use practices in Clayoquot Sound and re-examining the provincial forest practices and policies.

The media attention and threat to export markets engineered by environmental groups impelled the government to look at intervention in the B. C. forestry sector in general. The Forest Practices Code was introduced in the 1994 legislative session after a series of audits confirmed that forestry practices had not been meeting stream protection requirements (from both road construction and logging activities) (Wilson, 1998). The Code was rules-oriented, as opposed to results-based, and introduced copious numbers of regulations and guidelines. It was met with opposition from industry as a result of the impact on allowable annual cuts, and increased logging and plan approval costs.

Environmentalists were generally pleased with the shift to a stronger regulatory approach, the implementation of an independent watchdog organization, the Forest Practices Board, and limitations on the size of cutblocks (McDade and Haddock, 1994). The Code was criticised on the grounds of the high discretionary power given to Ministry of Forests district managers, lack of clear rules about what forest practices would be allowed, and the rules that were set down (particularly on riparian zones and biodiversity protection) were far from world class (McDade and Haddock, 1994).

It is debatable whether the protest in Clayoquot and the threat to export markets contrived by environmental groups directly led to the development of the Forest Practices

Code or whether it merely facilitated the process by giving the government the leverage to convince reluctant companies and workers of the necessity of change. It is not debatable however, that environmental groups' quest to bring international attention to the campaign to protect old growth had an impact on land use practices within Clayoquot Sound and on the entire province because of the threat of economic consequences (Wilson, 1998). Politicians and forest company officials were faced with unflattering media portrayals abroad and levels of foreign concern about forestry within B. C. that were high enough to worry them about risks to economic markets. European and American interests in B. C. forest practices had increased during the 1993 summer protests over Clayoquot Sound. Alliances had been built with sympathetic groups prior to the event and over the course of the summer visits by Robert Kennedy Jr., Tom Hayden, Australian rock group Midnight Oil, and other European politicians added to the media attention and sympathy for the cause.

MacMillan Bloedel's media public relations manager emphasised the difficulty in combating the opposition from foreign countries caused by environmental groups: "A picture of a clearcut can take a person's breath away, and it helps them convince people that that's all we do here in B. C. They have a parlour-room view of forestry [and the conclusion they make] is not a scientific conclusion, it's an emotional one" (Baldrey, 1994, p. A1). Nevertheless, the first cancellations of pulp contracts with companies operating in Clayoquot Sound occurred in March 1994 (by Scott Paper and Kimberly-Clark in the U.K.) and customers in Austria, Germany and the U.S. echoed concern over clearcutting in Clayoquot to the logging company and the B. C. government (Magnusson and Shaw, 2003). In fact, beginning in 1993 there were at least seven major international

promotional trips made by NDP government officials to promote the changed forest practices under the Forest Practices Code and mitigate the effects of the ENGO campaigns (Greenpeace, 1997). In 1997 Greenpeace, using government data, released a report that chronicled the discrepancies between the original commitments made by the B. C. government after its changes to forest practices and the actual practices. This report, *Broken Promises: The Truth About What's Happening in B. C.'s Forests*, prompted Premier Glen Clark to refer to Greenpeace and other environmentalists as “enemies of British Columbia” and branded the report as part of their “campaign of misinformation” (Boyd, 1997; Hunter, 1997). The government rallied behind the Forest Practices Code in the hopes of shedding the image that it and B. C.’s forest companies had gained from these campaigns.

The most significant policy change that arose from the conflict was the appointment of the Clayoquot Sound Scientific Panel, set up with the goal to create forest practices standards for Clayoquot Sound that were “not only the best in the province, but the best in the world” (Clayoquot Sound Scientific Panel, 1995, p. 1). During its term, which terminated May 29, 1995, the 19-person Panel generated five reports, containing over 170 recommendations for sustainable forest practices in Clayoquot Sound (Government of British Columbia, 2003). On June 6, 1995, the B. C. government announced its plan for the full implementation of all of the Scientific Panel's recommendations. Stressing the importance of “traditional ecological knowledge” the Panel made “sustainable ecosystem management” its main management objective for Clayoquot Sound, and called for the application of the precautionary principle, where the benefit of doubt is given to the resource instead of to extraction or development

(Clayoquot Sound Scientific Panel, 1995). With an emphasis on the ecosystem instead of on specific resources, a philosophical departure from the past was made. The Panel also stressed implementing an ecosystem approach to planning where sustaining the productivity and natural diversity took primacy and employing area-based rather than volume-based planning. Basing planning on a long-term perspective and at sub-regional, watershed, and site levels, and “using practices that represent the best application of scientific and traditional knowledge” were also emphasized (Clayoquot Sound Scientific Panel, 1995, p. 153). The Panel set out detailed recommendations based on these principles for planning, monitoring, silvicultural, harvesting, and transportation.

Acknowledging the progress in silviculture practices within the Sound, including a decreasing volume and total area cut as well as an increasing number of experiments with alternative silviculture approaches, the Panel still called for change (Clayoquot Sound Scientific Panel, 1995). It recommended the implementation of a “variable-retention silvicultural system” where retained trees and forest patches would create forest characteristics similar to natural disturbance patterns and would protect a variety of ecosystem components (Franklin, 1990). Retention levels would depend on the presence of other values; operations would be curtailed in areas that had significant non-timber values or in areas classified as sensitive due to factors such as visual management objectives or steep slopes. On cutting units with significant non-timber values or with sensitive areas, at least seventy percent of the forest would be retained, openings would be limited to a minimum of one third of a hectare, and snags, downed wood, old trees, and dying trees would be retained (Clayoquot Sound Scientific Panel, 1995). In less sensitive areas, the aim would be to retain at least fifteen percent of the forest (Clayoquot

Sound Scientific Panel, 1995). It recommended that by the end of 1999, all forestry done in Clayoquot Sound should be done according to these variable-retention principles.

The Panel's recommendations were unprecedented in their scope and emphasis on values other than resource extraction. Policies regarding land use in Clayoquot Sound would have to be tailored to a broader ecosystem approach, taking into account ecosystem health, scenic values, and recreational values. Armed with two epistemologies (science and traditional knowledge) the Panel sought to develop logging practices that would not compromise ecosystem integrity. This was an abrupt shift from the liquidation conversion model that had governed forestry in British Columbia since the inception of industrial forestry.

MacMillan Bloedel implemented logging experiments to the Panel's standards on a three year trial to determine whether there was a future for profitable logging in the Sound. It suspended its operations in 1997 and for the first time the protesters' demands had been met, no logging was occurring in the old-growth forests within MB cutblocks in Clayoquot Sound (Forest Practices Board, 2001). Forced to downsize and change its operations, MB had to accept the fact that it could not retain its traditional employment levels and rate of cut in the Sound under the Panel's guidelines. Assessing that profitable industrial logging would no longer occur in the Sound, MacMillan Bloedel went into negotiations with the Nuu-chah-nulth, who were eager to pursue economic development opportunities but needed access to the Tree Farm Licence owned by MB in order to begin logging. This marked a distinct change from events prior to the protest: while the protests themselves may not have forced MB to back out of Clayoquot Sound, threats to the bottom line as a result of new policies did.

In 1998, MB and Ma-Mook Natural Resources Limited (a Central Region Nuuchahnulth-owned economic development company) formed Iisaak Forest Resources Company, a joint-venture (forty-nine percent owned by MB and fifty-one percent owned by Ma-Mook) sustainability-focused logging company. With provincial approval, the tenure was transferred and both parties mutually benefited: the Nuuchahnulth gained access to a long-sought economic development opportunity and MB gained a public relations tool to improve its corporate image (Shaw, 2003).

Shortly thereafter, the company was purchased by the American giant, Weyerhaeuser, following the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on June 16, 1999 between five major environmental groups and the Nuuchahnulth Tribal Council. The MOU sought to govern future logging operations in the region and committed Iisaak to operating both under the principles and recommendations of the Scientific Panel, and targeting areas already fragmented by logging for future logging. This would spare the pristine watersheds from logging leaving them intact for other uses including ecotourism, traditional cultural uses, and sustainable harvesting of non-timber products. The logging that would occur (in the already fragmented forests) would be done on an ecologically-sustainable level with an emphasis on maintaining old-growth characteristics, and the wood produced would be eco-certified by Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) criteria. Under the MOU, if Iisaak met these commitments, the signatory environmental groups would support and endorse the company's practices and products.

The signing of the MOU also facilitated the creation of the area as a Biosphere Reserve⁴ under the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization's

⁴ A biosphere reserve is an international conservation designation given by UNESCO that seeks to promote a balanced relationship between humans and the environment. Through appropriate zoning and

(UNESCO's) Man and the Biosphere Programme (Shaw, 2003). Application for Biosphere Reserve designation requires virtually unanimous support from the region and agreement was reached mainly because the designation would change very little. It would not transfer jurisdiction to a body outside the region, nor add protection to any part of the region, it would simply be a "recognition of land use and jurisdictional arrangements already in place" (Shaw, 2003, p. 57). Both the federal and provincial governments had begun to hint at the possibility of contributing significant financial resources if the area was designated a biosphere reserve, largely due to the fact that the area's past had been so fraught with conflict and the designation was seen as a positive measure to help prevent further disturbances (O'Neil, 1996; Sinoski, 1999). A recommendation was forwarded to the United Nations in 1999 and on January 21, 2000, UNESCO officially designated the Clayoquot Sound Biosphere Reserve (Moore, 2003). With the designation came a \$12 million grant for an endowment fund from the federal government which would be managed by the Clayoquot Biosphere Trust and to be used to help uphold the spirit of the biosphere reserve designation.

The MOU and the biosphere reserve designation were significant occurrences in the aftermath of the conflict. The MOU committed five large ENGOs (Natural Resources Defense Council, Greenpeace International, Greenpeace Canada, Sierra Club of British Columbia, and the WCWC) to support a forestry company in its endeavours. For the first time organizations that had traditionally emphasized the preservation of Clayoquot Sound's old-growth forests were now committing to help support and advertise a company that would be making economic gains from the forests' resources. It differed in

management, the conservation of the biosphere's ecosystems and its biodiversity is sought to be maintained while encouraging sustainable development for the area's population.

that the economy set up was one based on conservation and sustainable use and was designated to support the region's First Nations, who had previously been denied access to large-scale economic development opportunities. Previously, logging in the Sound was driven by multinational corporations whose operations were directed by shareholders whose livelihoods did not so intimately depend on the continued access to the Sound's resources and the health and sustainability of its ecosystems. Multinational corporations, unlike small operations, have the ability and capital to pick up operations and move to areas where further profits are to be had when one area is exhausted of its resources (Stefanick, 2001). Because Iisaak was a joint-venture company with First Nations, many of its workers' and owners' livelihoods did depend on both continuous access to the Sound's resources and to the sustainability and ecological integrity of its ecosystems.

A biosphere reserve designation for Clayoquot Sound did not increase the region's protected areas, add further bureaucracy, prohibit logging, or inhibit treaty negotiations; however, it could raise the international profile of the Sound, promote research and innovations in "sustainable ecosystem-based resource management and institutional frameworks, to integrate planning for marine and terrestrial ecosystems, and to use the biosphere designation as a tool for seeking funds to assist with economic diversification and transition" (Clayoquot Sound Central Region Board, 1996a). The danger of the designation is that many people, unsure of the goals of biosphere reserves, assume that the designation is comparable to a national or provincial park designation, where protection of the land is provided. The designation increases the international profile of the Sound; however, in doing so it can erroneously lead people to believe the area has become encased in one large protected area. The FOCS lamented this in their

report after the designation occurred, citing that the term could be misleading because no new land or marine protection is offered with designation, as “nobody is legally bound by any new environmental rules” (Friends of Clayoquot Sound, 2000, p. 1).

Changing policies in the aftermath of a movement, in this case a protest, is just one way to assess success. Gamson’s (1990) second criterion for assessing the success of a movement is the acceptance of the dissenting group itself as a legitimate organization with valid social interests. Taking this criterion further, Rochon and Mazmanian (1993) argue that the acceptance of these groups usually leads to access to the policy process and inclusion in policy forming discussions. Using this criterion, success of the conflict in changing land use practices can be concluded if the dissenting group gains acceptance as having valid and important interests and access to policy forming discussions. In Clayoquot Sound, the conflict instigators were the Nuu-chah-nulth First Nations and the ENGOs. The principal local and national ENGOs were the FOCS, WCWC, Sierra Club, Temperate Rainforest Alliance, and Greenpeace. The controversy and subsequent fallout changed the involvement of various stakeholders in the decisions surrounding the future of land use practices in Clayoquot Sound.

One immediate change was the changing relationship between the province and the Nuu-chah-nulth First Nations. In October, immediately after the protest the province announced its willingness, for the first time, to recognize and negotiate with the representatives of the Nuu-chah-nulth (Ingram, 1994). Negotiations between the Nuu-chah-nulth and the provincial government resulted in the Interim Measures Agreement (IMA) which established a joint-management arrangement based on a new Central Region Board and sought to be a bridge in the land claim treaty process. Under it,

provisions were made to promote sustainability, reduce unemployment among First Nations communities, foster a sustainable forest industry in the area, and restore fish and wildlife habitat (Greer and Kucey, 1997). First Nations were also given the right to review and veto proposed resource development plans in Clayoquot Sound. This marked a significant change from the 1980s when attempts by First Nations at protesting resource development within their traditional territory was met with the consequence of the nation's judicial system. In 1988 while protesting the logging road construction along Sulphur Passage, the entrance to the pristine Megin Valley and within his peoples' traditional Ahousaht territory, Hereditary Chief Earl Maquinna George was arrested (Maquinna George, 2003). For the first time, First Nations in Clayoquot Sound were recognized as having valid and important interests and given access to the policy formation process.

Prior to the conflict of 1993, all the advisory bodies and processes for adjudicating resource-use disputes that had sought to equitably divide Clayoquot Sound for various land uses had had representation from environmental groups, the IWA and other community interests, and forestry companies (including the Clayoquot Sound Sustainable Development Task Force, Clayoquot Sound Sustainable Development Steering Committee, and CORE). Due to the inclusion of stakeholders, consensus was difficult to reach due to conflicting demands and the "talk and log" approach where resource extraction continued while negotiations were proceeding. The Scientific Panel awarded no direct representation to these stakeholders; instead it linked a varied team of experts (specialists in areas such as biodiversity, fisheries, forest harvest planning, ethnobotany, silviculture systems, recreation, hydrology, slope stability, road

engineering, and worker safety) with First Nations representatives (Clayoquot Sound Scientific Panel, 1995). It was chaired by Richard Atleo, a Nuu-chah-nulth hereditary chief and Malaspina University-College instructor and Fred Bunnell, a UBC professor of forest wildlife ecology and management (Clayoquot Sound Scientific Panel, 1995). Wilson (1998) notes that prior to the conflict in Clayoquot it would have been difficult to assemble a panel of forest experts that proved threatening to the forest industry orthodoxy, but this panel was threatening. Several members of the Panel could be classified as strong critics of “business as usual” forest practices including Bunnell, UVic ethnobotanist Nancy Turner, University of Washington’s Jerry Franklin, and SFU forest ecologist Ken Lertzman (Wilson, 1998). The placement of these panel members, academic experts and First Nations, marks a fundamental change of approach to land use planning. The industry accepting the committee without visible protests suggests that after the summer of protest, MacMillan Bloedel had “decided to write down its Clayoquot Sound assets and resign itself to the area’s use as a kind of new forestry experimentation zone” (Wilson, 1998, p. 314).

While the lack of inclusion of environmental groups may be seen as a mark of non-success of the protest (following the criterion of Rochon and Mazmanian, 1993), the Scientific Panel’s recommendations for future land use practices in the Sound took into account the demands sought by these groups (particularly phasing out clearcut logging in the region). Vayrynen (1991) cites the success of a movement if changes are made to the policy process. The Scientific Panel’s appointment and its recommendations for policy marked an abrupt change from how policy had previously been decided, differing in both the appointees on the committee and the goals that were addressed. Bringing in experts

in fields pertaining to resource use to collaborate with First Nations was a fundamentally different approach to land use planning, as was recommending policies based on best practices as opposed to practices based on partisan interests.

The third measure of success of movements, set out by Rochon and Mazmanian (1993) and Vayrynen (1991), in addition to changes in public policy and changes to the policy process, is a change in social values and awareness. This is closely linked to a movement's ability to garner attention and bring to light the larger issues at play. Protest can be a bargaining resource to apply negative pressure on decision makers; effectiveness is derived from the movement's ability to create disorder and apply pressure on opponents (Wilson, 1961). As a measure of success, Lipsky (1968) sees protests as a means of attracting media attention and garnering further commitment to the cause from sympathetic, but previously inactive groups with political resources. The media attention garnered from Clayoquot Sound, both the civil disobedience acts and the international campaign that used the Sound as its microcosm of all that is wrong with B. C.'s forest practices did bring about success in changing social values, commitment levels, and awareness of larger issues.

The protests brought attention to Clayoquot Sound as a place but also to the larger issue of the logging of old-growth, the necessity for the development of other forest uses, and the need for increased scientific inquiry and inventories of biodiversity. Clayoquot Sound brought the issue of the extraction of old-growth forests to international audiences. Historically attention on deforestation was centered on the better publicized tropical rainforests; the protest in Clayoquot Sound brought the attention of the world to the destruction of temperate rainforests. In appealing to the emotional side of people, ENGO

campaigns fostered a surge of support and appreciation for what had once been a little-known blip on the Canadian map. The protest and campaign brought awareness and as a result they fostered an insurgence of support for those organizations which were dedicated to protecting the region. In B. C. at least, membership in the WCWC, and Sierra Club has steadily risen since the early 1990s (WCWC, 2006; Sierra Club of Canada, 2005). While the increases cannot be directly linked to the events in Clayoquot Sound, the events were some of the most publicized by these organizations in the 1990s. The campaigns put Clayoquot Sound on the map. The area's beauty and the media attention attracted people to experience it for themselves. Eco-tourism was touted as an alternative to resource extraction. Beginning in 1993, the WCWC boardwalked long "witness" trails throughout the pristine valleys with volunteer labour in order to attract tourism with the hope that in experiencing the Sound, visitors would want to fight to protect it (WCWC, 1993). The protests acted as advertisements (so-called "envirotising") for how green and beautiful that part of B. C. can be, if and only if, people are willing to defend it (Luke, 2003, p. 105).

The protests renewed interest in scientific inquiry and the need for more extensive inventories on biodiversity to be done. As a guiding principle, the Scientific Panel stated that the "information on the resources of Clayoquot Sound and the understanding of its forest ecosystems is incomplete" (Clayoquot Sound Scientific Panel, 1995a, p. 26). To take one example, little is know about the invertebrates of Clayoquot Sound, despite their importance to ecosystem functions of soil building, decomposition, nutrient cycling, pollination, and seed or spore dispersal (Clayoquot Sound Scientific Panel, 1995). Protection of the Carmanah watershed led to increased interest and work in the region on

canopy-dwelling insects the early 1990s which led to the discovery of several species new to science (Winchester, 1993; Winchester and Ring, 1996; Winchester, Wiggins and Ring, 1993). With Carmanah's geographic proximity to Clayoquot Sound and similarity in vegetation, it is reasonable to assume that the tree canopies of Clayoquot Sound are equally rich in unknown species (Clayoquot Sound Scientific Panel, 1995).

As a result of the conflict and international attention, many international purchasers of B. C. forest products did not want to contribute to the continuation of unsustainable logging. They began to demand a universally accepted system of certification that would ensure that the products being purchased were not contributing to the environmental and social destruction shown on the campaign videos and posters distributed during the ENGO campaign against B. C.'s forest practices. Four main certification systems emerged in B. C.: Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), International Organization for Standardization (ISO), Canadian Standards Association (CSA), and Sustainable Forestry Initiative (SFI). FSC is the only certification system that has standards regarding plantations and maintenance of high conservation value forests (old-growth) and was seen to be the system most likely to satisfy environmentalists and others concerned about the logging of old-growth forests (Tan, 2003; Rametsteiner and Simula, 2003). Whether Iisaak chose it or was forced to in order to attain peace with the ENGOs, FSC was the certification system adopted by Iisaak to meet the concerns of the local and international environmental groups, and of Canadian citizens more broadly, who had protested against logging in Clayoquot Sound in 1993 (Gill, 2002). The need for certification grew out of the increasing concern about unsustainable logging practices in the world, of which logging in temperate rainforests was a part. In 1992, the United

Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) produced a set of five international agreements related to sustainable development and included a non-binding statement of forest principles for the management, conservation, and sustainable development of the world's forests. Since these beginnings, certification has developed and caught on among forest companies as a result of consumer pressure. As of June 2007, the total forest area certified by sustainable forest management standards in B.C. (CSA, FSC, SFI) was 48,040,967 hectares and the annual allowable cut that is certified was 77,746,727 cubic metres (Canadian Sustainable Forestry Certification Coalition, 2007). The need for certification grew out of conflicts like that in Clayoquot Sound. It is no coincidence that the first FSC certified Tree Farm License holder in British Columbia was Iisaak (which grew out of the conflict). With increased attention on the forestry activities, consumers wanted assurance that they were not contributing to the destruction of old-growth forests.

Later Changes

Although many of these developments in Clayoquot Sound demonstrate positive changes and meet the requirements of success as demonstrated by Gamson (1990), Rochon and Mazmanian (1993), Vayrynen (1991), Lipsky (1968), and Wilson (1961), not all the positive changes have persisted over the longer term. The NDP government introduced a reform package to help improve forest policy that had come under scrutiny after the controversy in Clayoquot. The Forest Practices Code, composed of prescriptive-based guidelines, was introduced with the aim to make forestry companies more responsible for damage to the lands and ecosystems on which timber extraction occurs. Generally it was met with higher approval by environmental groups in terms of its

policies towards maintaining ecosystem health than previous legislation (keeping in mind that it too was not without criticism) (Wilson, 1998). Coming to power in 2001, the Liberal government replaced the prescriptive legislation Code with the results-based Forest and Range Practices Act (FRPA) in November 2002. While it is too soon to assess what actual changes will occur, as Forest Stewardship Plans detailing logging companies' intended cutting areas were not due to be handed in until late spring 2007, there is some apprehension among environmental groups and with the government-appointed forest watchdog, the Forest Practices Board. There is concern about the reduced supervision by the provincial government, weaker approval criteria for plans, lack of specific measurable standards, less public involvement and consideration, lack of accountability for setting results, and the centralization of ministerial power (Forest Practices Board, 2006; West Coast Environmental Law, 2004; Sierra Legal Defense Fund/Forest Watch (SLDF/FW), 2002). Other concerns include the reduction of staff available to carry out the more complex compliance and enforcement activities necessitated by a deregulated system and the difficulty for the independent watchdog organization, the Forest Practices Board to continue its role as a result of the FRPA having no clear indicators against which to audit (Schreckenber, 2006).

Honing down on the potential impact on Clayoquot specifically from the new legislation, there is concern that under the FRPA, all the government-endorsed plans procured for the Sound (including the Scientific Panel's recommendations) are not entrenched in legislation and do not have to be included in Forest Stewardship Plans, meaning that they may not be binding on the tenure holders in the region. With the new legislation, the Forest Stewardship Plan holder "has no responsibility to directly address

these government-endorsed plans [in reference to the Clayoquot Sound land use decision, the Clayoquot Sound Scientific Panel recommendations and Clayoquot Sound watershed plans], as they are not objectives set by government under the Forest and Range Practices Act” (B. C. Government, 2007, p. 5976). In essence, the Scientific Panel land use recommendations and watershed plans are not designated as legal objectives and therefore are not legally-enforceable. Although the Ministry of Forest and Range emphasizes that they may become legal objectives under the FRPA, in the meanwhile, just a verbal agreement, from the two current forest licensees operating within Clayoquot Sound pledging voluntarily acceptance of the objectives articulated by the Clayoquot Sound Central Region Board, is protecting “all that work and all that activity...that was the heart and soul of the war in the woods” (B. C. Government, 2007, p. 5976). While these companies (Iisaak and Interfor, the latter now owned by the Central Region Chiefs and Coulson Forest Products) may follow through with their agreement to take the recommendations and watershed plans into account when establishing Forest Stewardship Plans, they are not legally bound to do so. Without enshrining First Nations land-use planning outcomes in law, the Sound’s pristine areas may not be protected. Under a new government, the future of those policies and solutions that arose in the aftermath of the conflict is uncertain; governmental policy has a fragile and fleeting nature and runs the risk of not withstanding shifting priorities that inevitably follow changes in ruling parties.

As a result of community pressure, limited capacity, and environmental requirements, Iisaak has stated that it has been limited from cutting the volume of timber set out in their established AAC (SmartWood Program, 2005). For the years 2000-2004,

an AAC of 123,800 m³ was set for Iisaak's TFL (TFL 57). Of this amount, 115,500 m³ was apportioned to Iisaak and 8,300 m³ went to the government's Small Business Forest Enterprise Program (SmartWood Program, 2005). This ACC was significantly lower than the AAC for the area when it was part of MacMillan Bloedel's tenure (TFL 44) and was considerably lower than the AAC for the area prior to the completion of the work by the Scientific Panel (which recommended area-based determinations as opposed to volume-based and called for variable retention silviculture practices). Iisaak harvested 22,197 m³ of timber in 2000, or sixteen percent of their AAC (SmartWood Program, 2005). In 2001 and 2002 Iisaak continued to cut a relatively small percentage of the maximum AAC established by the Chief Forester but increased its cut as its capacity grew and it became more familiar with the new planning and cutting systems developed by the Scientific Panel (SmartWood Program, 2005). The years 2004-2005 saw the release of a new AAC for TFL 57, an AAC of 381 hectares (B. C. Ministry of Forest and Range, 2004). It was the first area-based determination and was intended to test the effectiveness of regulating harvest levels by area rather than volume (B. C. Ministry of Forests, 2005).

In May 2005 Ma-Mook Natural Resources, which represents the five Central Region Nuu-chah-nulth First Nations, bought out Weyerhaeuser's forty-nine percent stake in Iisaak Forest Resources, leaving the company and forest tenure wholly First Nations owned. Provincial forest requirements, which continue to encourage industrial logging, have caused an overlapping of operations with Interfor, thus making it impractical to initiate pioneering practices (Hamilton, 2006). This coupled with the company's limited capacity, weak and shifting management, expensive and competitive

subcontractor arrangements, more than one year of cutting under volume, insufficient working capital, community pressure, and environmental regulations resulted in low profits for Iisaak in its first years of operation (SmartWood Program, 2005; Brenda Reid-Kuecks, personal communication, August 2, 2007). Accordingly, Iisaak has been harvesting higher timber volumes each year to increase profit margins, thus posing a risk to the Sound's pristine watersheds and its delicate relationship with the ENGOS (SmartWood, 2005). By early 2002 the company had spent \$2.3 million Canadian and had lost \$550,000 per year since its start-up in 1999 (Gill, 2002). In 2006, seeking management support, Iisaak formed an agreement with Ecotrust Canada in which Iisaak would turn management over to Ecotrust to establish a conservation-based economy within Clayoquot Sound, marking the first time any B. C. forest company has restructured for not only the bottom line, but to make it ecologically sustainable as well (Hamilton, 2006). Iisaak, the largest FSC-certified forest products company in Canada when it acquired certification in 2001, employs a 'Quadruple Bottom Line' approach to its forest management, where commitment is made to environmental, social, economic, and cultural sustainability (Iisaak Forest Resources, 2003). That said, Iisaak had its certification suspended in September 2006 as a result of not cutting enough fiber, too high levels of wood waste within cutblocks, their inability to demonstrate the benefits they were contributing to local populations, and not having a business plan (Brenda Reid-Kuecks, personal communication., August 2, 2007).

Although the protest greatly reduced industrial scale logging and the implementation of the Scientific Panel's recommendations reduced it further, Interfor, the second largest multinational logging company in Clayoquot Sound remained active.

Interfor continued to log about 75,000 cubic metres of wood per year in Clayoquot Sound off its 49,000 hectare Tree Farm License (Friends of Clayoquot Sound, n.d.).

Environmentalists continued to protest and attempted to prevent Interfor from logging in some of the Sound's remaining pristine areas, where it still retained some logging rights. FOCS, the one organization closely concerned with Clayoquot Sound which did not sign the MOU between Iisaak and five of B. C.'s largest environmental groups, has since continued to travel abroad to educate major wood purchasers about the impacts of industrial logging. They did this in the hopes of protecting several pristine watersheds still open to logging, including Sydney Valley, Ursus Valley, Clayoquot River Valley, Satchie Creek, Hesquiat Lake Creek, Flores Island, Pretty Girl Wilderness and Sulphur Pass (Friends of Clayoquot Sound, 2006). In the fall of 2006, BC Timber Sales, a branch of the provincial government, proposed a Forest Stewardship Plan that planned logging within the Upper Kennedy River in the northeast corner of Clayoquot Sound. The result of lobbying by environmental groups of B. C. was a five year moratorium on logging in the intact headwaters of the Upper Kennedy, leaving four thousand hectares (10,000 acres) of magnificent, old-growth temperate rainforest safe from logging for another five years; however, 7,000 hectares of partially logged old-growth forest, further downstream in the Kennedy Valley, were not deferred and cutting is expected to begin in 2008 (Friends of Clayoquot Sound, 2007).

In studying the success of the civil rights protests, Terchek (1974) relies on change as the determiner of their success. His standard for assessing change is the same standard employed during the civil rights movement in the early 1960s: the amount of actual desegregation. Applying his methods to Clayoquot Sound, the base standard for

comparison would be the actual amount of logging occurring in the Sound. Although an inadequate measure from which to judge long term effectiveness, it is an effective measure for examining short-term results (Terchek, 1974). In terms of land use statistics, the protests did have an impact. Logging did decrease after the summer of protest. Harvest levels dropped from 959,311 cubic metres per year in 1988 to 421,547 cubic metres by 1994 and the total area cut dropped from 1,280 hectares in 1988 to 408 hectares in 1994 (Clayoquot Sound Scientific Panel, 1995, p.49). Other environmentalist organisations called for the preservation of all Clayoquot Sound's pristine valleys and islands, allowing "ecoforestry", or single tree logging, to be practiced in the already fragmented areas. The Scientific Panel's recommendations for variable retention largely meet this demand; however, the Panel still allows the logging of old-growth forest, including logging of intact valleys. The FOCS, which initiated the protest, called for the logging of old-growth in Clayoquot Sound to be stopped and their initial demand has not been met. The logging of old-growth has significantly decreased, but it has not stopped.

On March 30, 2007 Interfor sold its Tree Farm License 54 in Clayoquot Sound to the Nuu-Chah-Nulth (Ma-Mook Natural Resources) who financed the purchase by establishing a joint-venture with Coulson Forest Products from Port Alberni (Interfor, 2007; Friends of Clayoquot Sound, 2007). While it is too soon to tell, without an conservation-driven organization at the management helm (like Ecotrust) this tenure, with an AAC of 66,759 cubic meters per year, may not be developed with the same attention to live stand management and value-added enhancement as that committed by Ecotrust in their management of Iisaak (Brenda Reid-Kuecks, personal communication, August 2, 2007; Interfor, 2007). Coulson may treat the tenure as fiber supply to feed

their Port Alberni mill and continue the emphasis on volume-based, rather than area-based cut (Interfor, 2007). The company is planning to implement the already approved Interfor plan which is for 68,000 m³ per year (Brenda Reid-Kuecks, personal communication, August 2, 2007). It is also too soon to know whether the timber harvested and milled from TFL 54 will be certified according to Forest Stewardship Council standards under Ma-Mook and Coulson.

In July 2006, the Central Region Board announced the completion of the final watershed plans (recommended by the Scientific Panel for identifying reserves to protect a range of forest values). The watershed plans were the primary strategy for achieving ecosystem management objectives and would set out a new approach to planning and take into account watershed integrity, biological diversity, and human values (Clayoquot Sound Technical Planning Committee, 2006). The plans were designed to preserve the long-term ecosystem integrity of each watershed planning unit, in addition to protecting important cultural sites and recreational and scenic values. Taking into account the recommendations of the Scientific Panel, the watershed plans also designated the available harvestable areas, some of which are within the pristine valleys (as much as 90,000 hectares according to environmentalists) (August, 2006). The announcement was met with anger by environmental groups including Greenpeace and WCWC who had signed the MOU with the intention of keeping the pristine valleys protected and concentrating extraction in already fragmented areas. With these areas still at risk of being logged, the peace gained between the two groups in the MOU is delicate at best. It also marks the non-permanence of changes derived from the protest of 1993.

Discussion

According to Giugni (1998), the ultimate end of social movements is to bring about change. The mass protests and conflict in Clayoquot Sound in 1993 did bring about change. It forced the government to react to negative international attention on the province's forest practices and policies. In response, in 1995 the provincial government introduced the Forest Practices Code, which provided a process to make land-use plans legally binding, set out rules for planning prior to logging, set standards for how logging operations would proceed, and established a new monitoring and enforcement system (SLDF/FW, 2002). The protests also spurred on and expedited the development of a Scientific Panel of research experts and First Nations, set up to introduce world class forestry practices in the region. Still under public scrutiny, the government was forced to approve the implementation of all of the Scientific Panel's recommendations in 1995. The recommendations made sweeping changes to forest policy: employing both scientific and traditional ecological knowledge, stressing the application of the precautionary principle, emphasizing the ecosystem instead of specific resources, introducing area-based as opposed to volume-based planning, basing planning on longer time frames, and implementing variable retention harvesting techniques as opposed to the traditional sustained yield or liquidation-conversion harvesting system.

The conflict in Clayoquot also resulted in new stakeholders obtaining a voice in policy formation, particularly the Nuu-chah-nulth First Nations. The formation of Iisaak Forest Resources marked the first time the Nuu-chah-nulth became an active participant in the region's economic development opportunities. The signing of a Memorandum of

Understanding in 1999 between the Nuu-chah-nulth Tribal Council and the province's primary ENGOs brought relative peace whereby Iisaak would be supported by the conflict instigators if Iisaak operated under the principles and recommendations of the Scientific Panel (including targeting areas already fragmented by logging for future extraction).

The conflict resulted in an increased awareness of the environmental impacts of conventional industrial logging and the destruction of the world's temperate rainforest. The conflict put Clayoquot Sound as a place on the map, bringing the area into the hearts and minds of people all over the world. The contentious nature of the controversy led to the demand for certification of Clayoquot Sound's, and B. C.'s timber products; international purchasers wanted assurance of their non-involvement of the destruction of the Sound's forests. In terms of on-the ground results, the protest did change the actual cutting rates and harvesting practices. Cutting rates greatly decreased, in both the MB and Interfor-owned TFLs in the aftermath of the controversy. Watershed plans were compiled for the region, from the recommendations of the Scientific Panel, and clearcut extraction was phased out and replaced with variable retention techniques.

In having the benefit of the passage of time, the success in stimulating change of the protest can be assessed over a longer time frame. As the government in power changes, legislation and policies follow. The Liberal government replaced the NDP, who had had been intimately acquainted with the issues surrounding the war in the woods. The Liberals set up measures to change the policies employed by the NDP to ease the controversy. In bringing in the Forest and Range Practices Act and the requirement of Forest Stewardship Plans, the Liberals did not entrench all the government-endorsed

plans procured for the Sound in the aftermath of the protest (including the Scientific Panel's recommendations). Without being set in legislation the Clayoquot Sound Scientific Panel recommendations and Clayoquot Sound watershed plans may not be binding on the present tenure holders in Clayoquot Sound. This brings into the question of the permanence of the policy changes gained as a result of the controversy.

There are two TFLs within Clayoquot Sound today (TFL 54 held by the Nuu-chah-nulth in a joint-venture with Coulson Forest Products and TFL 57 held by Iisaak, a Nuu-chah-nulth company being managed by Ecotrust). It is too soon to assess whether or not the management of TFL 54 will be done with attention to live stand management, value-added development, or become FSC-certified. Iisaak, being a small company operating a large TFL with a very new management structure, risks losing a portion its tenure (as a result of cutting very little in its first years in operation). In order to keep its allotted AAC for next year, Iisaak must extract the total area outlined in their AAC (Brenda Reid-Kuecks, personal communication, August 2, 2007). This ultimately means increasing the amount of timber extracted from the Sound's old-growth forests (as there are only about 1000 ha of 40-60 year old second growth, and virtually no second growth older than 60 years on their TFL) (SmartWood, 2005).

With the completion of the final watershed plans for Clayoquot Sound (which delineate harvestable areas that do not interfere with cultural sites or recreational or ecological values) in 2006 and the announcement of the intended logging within the pristine watersheds, Iisaak faces growing alienation from those environmental groups that brought about the protest and promised to support the company in its quest to be a sustainable logging corporation within the Sound. It also marks a failure of retaining

protection for the pristine watersheds, which was sought in the protests (Maryjka Mychajlowycz, personal communication, August 15, 2007). The MOU was signed by environmental groups under the perception that the pristine watersheds would not be the site of extraction activities (Shaw, 2003). The announcement of the intended logging within the watersheds marked a reversal of the positive changes achieved as a result of the protest.

With the goal of decreasing the amount of cut, Iisaak seeks to increase the value of each tree cut (through value-added manufacturing and live stand management); however, their lack of capacity and infrastructure results in the sale of the timber to larger company-owned mills in Ucluelet or Port Alberni (including Coulson and Interfor owned operations) (Iisaak Forest Resources, 2003a). Traditionally forestry has been based on a liquidation-conversion model and infrastructure is based on such a model, putting resources before ecosystem and landscape health. The pressures are great on a company that is forging a new approach to forestry in a vacuum of the traditional approach (National Round Table on the Environment and the Economy, 2003). There is also concern about the lack of monitoring to assess the impacts of forest operations against the Scientific Panel's recommendations and apply adaptive management (National Round Table on the Environment and the Economy, 2003). Without monitoring, it cannot be known how well the Scientific Panel's regulations are being followed and what impact they may be having.

To assess whether or not the outcomes of the protest were an all-encompassing solution to the original grievances, one has to look no further than what happened to the policy that sparked the protests originally. The spark was the April 13, 1993 Clayoquot

Sound Land Use Decision and it was not repealed. In fact, not only was it not repealed, it continues to live on as the basis for land use planning in Clayoquot Sound. The Decision formed the basis for the land use designation when the Sound became a biosphere reserve in 2000. The protected areas designated in the Decision became the Reserve's core protected areas, and the "General Integrated" and "Special Management Areas" became the transition and buffer zones (See Appendices 1 and 2). Biosphere reserves have legally protected core areas (where protection of landscapes and ecosystems is the top priority), buffer zones (in which activities are aimed so they help support the conservation objectives of the core areas), and zones of cooperation (where sustainable use of resources can occur) (UNESCO, 2003). The criticism of the Decision was that it did not sufficiently stop ecosystem destruction, as a result of the fragmented nature of the new protected areas, and the protected areas were made up of commercially unattractive land (lacked old-growth forests). Critics point out that because of the adoption of the area designation from the 1993 Decision, much of the reserve's core protected areas are not protecting the old-growth forests that have become synonymously associated with the area. The instigating organization of the protests, the Friends of Clayoquot Sound, called for the logging of old-growth forests in Clayoquot Sound to cease. While others involved in the protest were satisfied with the policy changes incurred and the implementation of variable retention harvesting techniques, the FOCS were not. The logging of old-growth in Clayoquot Sound was reduced, but it did not stop.

With uncertainty over the legal-entrenchment of the policies regarding land use in Clayoquot Sound as well as the difficulties of the area's first conservation-based forestry company in trying to implement sustainable forest practices within a system directed

towards extracting volume instead of value, the future of Iisaak maintaining its conservation-focus is unknown (Brenda Reid-Kuecks, personal communication, August 2, 2007). With increasing extraction occurring in Clayoquot Sound and movement into its pristine valleys, it is evident that the changes incurred immediately after the protest were not permanent. It is a matter of time before it will be known whether or not a conservation-economy focused company will succeed in deriving economic benefits from the extraction of the Sound's forests while satisfying the organizations which initiated the protest of 1993. Even fourteen years later, the issues and contentious nature of land use designation still persist.

Conclusion

By using Clayoquot Sound as a case study to assess whether protest can be an effective stimulus for altering land use practices and bringing about land use change, it becomes evident that it can, although with a long enough time period, the changes incurred may not persist and they may not be far reaching enough to satisfy particular parties involved in the protest. Clayoquot Sound had indeed had a recent history of intense and bitter conflict as a result of land use practices. This conflict culminated in the summer protest of 1993 when hundreds of people willingly had themselves arrested in protest of the industrial logging activities occurring within the forests of the Sound. What made the conflict particularly difficult was that both the clashing parties (the environmental-First Nations alliance and MacMillan Bloedel) saw the only acceptable outcome as a win for one side at the expense of the other. This establishment of a zero-sum game, where one side's win means the other side's loss, initially made compromise very difficult. A purely green solution was impossible as a result of the human

complexity in the region, including the Nuu-chah-nulth land claims to the area as well as the poverty on nearby reservations. The source of the solution to the conflict would prove to be compromise, where consideration was given to all stakeholders and cultural, social, economic, and environmental aspects were all considered. The origin of and the solution to the conflict is the area's land and resources and how they are utilized. As long as there are differing views about land use, conflict is likely. There is a need for residents to derive economic benefits from the forests of Clayoquot Sound, yet there is also a need to preserve the land for a myriad of other reasons. The equilibrium between sustainable and unsustainable use is very precarious to maintain. It is evident in the fallout from the past conflict, that the battle to maintain this balance is enduring and constant. It is apparent that although the 1993 protest has passed, many of the same issues that incited the conflict still lurk below the surface. Only time will tell whether these issues will come to the surface and Clayoquot Sound is once again thrust into the international spotlight and staged to hold round two of the war in the woods.

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
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Appendix 1


Clayoquot Sound UNESCO Biosphere Reserve Map



(Clayoquot Biosphere Trust, n.d.).

Appendix 2

1993 Clayoquot Sound Land Use Decision Map



(B. C. Government, 1993).